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Abstract: The suppression of drug consumption and trade is high on the
Government of Vietnam’s agenda. To accomplish this goal, Vietnam employs
repressive policies that often contravene international human rights law.
Among the most detrimental and problematic policies are the incarceration
of drug users in compulsory treatment centers, and the stigmatization and
abuse of consumers by the police. Vietnamese drug policy is, however, slowly
changing in the face of one of Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics. While the
Communist Government of the early-1990s designated illicit drugs as a “social
evil” to be eradicated through punitive and often repressive means, the recent
implementation of harm reduction approaches have reduced the level of
needle sharing, and thus HIV transmission. This briefing will explore the
current trends in drug consumption, production, and trafficking before looking
at the key harms and threats associated with drugs in Vietnam. This will be
followed by a summary of Vietnam’s drug policies, including the country’s
approach to drug treatment, harm reduction, and illicit opium suppression:
Vietnam is one of a small number of states to have suppressed illicit opium
production, an intervention that centred upon coercive negotiations with
limited alternative development. The briefing will conclude with some tenta-
tive recommendations for reform and thoughts on what could be expected
from Vietnam during the Special Session of the United Nations General
Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016).
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Introduction
The suppression of drug consumption and trade is high on the Government of
Vietnam’s agenda. To accomplish this goal, Vietnam employs repressive policies
that often contravene international human rights law. Among the most
*Corresponding author: James Windle, School of Business and Law, University of East London,
University Square 1 Salway Road, London E15 1N, UK, E-mail: J.Windle@uel.ac.uk
Journal of Drug Policy Analysis 2015; aop
Authenticated | J.Windle@uel.ac.uk author's copy
Download Date | 10/30/15 1:21 PM
detrimental and problematic policies are the incarceration of drug users in com-
pulsory treatment centers, and the stigmatization and abuse of consumers by the
police. That said, Vietnamese drug policy is slowly changing in the face of one of
Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics. While the Communist Government of the
early-1990s designated illicit drugs as a “social evil” to be eradicated through
punitive and often repressive means, the recent implementation of harm reduction
approaches have reduced the level of needle sharing, and thus HIV transmission.
This briefing will explore the current trends in drug consumption, produc-
tion, and trafficking before looking at the key harms and threats associated with
drugs in Vietnam. This will be followed by a summary of Vietnam’s drug
policies, including the country’s approach to drug treatment, harm reduction,
and illicit opium suppression – Vietnam is one of a small number of states to
have suppressed illicit opium production, an intervention that centred upon
coercive negotiations with limited alternative development. The briefing will
conclude with some tentative recommendations for reform and thoughts on
what could be expected from Vietnam during the Special Session of the United
Nations General Assembly on the World Drug Problem (UNGASS 2016).
Trends in Drug Production, Trafficking,
and Consumption
While Vietnam is no longer a major source of illicit opium, and its geographical
position limits its role as a transhipment point for drugs produced elsewhere in
Southeast Asia, its importance in the regional flow of drugs could be increasing.
While heroin is the most widely consumed drug, amphetamine-type stimulants
(ATS) consumption is rising. This section will explore these trends in drug
production, trafficking, and consumption.
Drug Production
Vietnam is not a major source of any illicit drug. While the northern mountain
provinces1 have long histories of opium production, between 1990 and 2001,
Vietnamese opium production declined by 98%, from an estimated peak of 90
metric tons to two metric tons. This was achieved through the employment of
1 Nghe Son, Son La, Lai Chau, and Lao Lai provinces have historically been the predominant
sources of Vietnamese opium.
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coercive negotiations to persuade farmers to stop growing opium, rather than
the establishment of alternative incomes. As such, the intervention negatively
impacted many (ex-)opium farming communities. While small amounts of
opium continue to be cultivated in northern mountain provinces, the country
has the capacity to contain production. Cannabis production is limited; how-
ever, the trend toward the use of modern technology in indoor and outdoor
farms may increase output. The manufacturing of ATS is a new occurrence and
so far remains limited.2 The increasing availability of ATS precursor chemicals
could, however, boost domestic manufacturing.
Trafficking
Seizures are dominated by heroin, followed by smaller amounts of opium,
cannabis, and ATS. While Vietnam borders areas which are major sources of
ATS and opium (China, Cambodia, and Laos), its location on the outskirts of the
Greater Mekong Sub-region limits its role in the regional flow of ATS and
opiates. It does, however, play a relatively small but growing role as a tranship-
ment point for heroin, methamphetamine, and precursor chemicals, primarily
destined for East Asia and Oceania. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations
Economic Community (AEC) free trade agreement and improving regional trans-
port links will likely increase the flow of illicit drugs through the region,
including Vietnam, as drugs and precursor chemicals piggyback on the
increased flows of licit goods. Vietnam is already emerging as a source of
precursor chemicals diverted from domestic chemical wholesalers. Between
2002 and 2006 Vietnamese imports of pseudoephedrine and ephedrine increased
by 262%, of which an undefined but potentially significant amount was diverted
to the illicit drug trade.3
2 See United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-
Type Stimulants and Other Drugs: Asia and Pacific (Vienna: UNODC, 2011), http://www.unodc.org/
documents/scientific/2013_Regional_ATS_Report_web.pdf; UNODC, Transnational Organized
Crime in East Asia and the Pacific: A Threat Assessment (Bangkok: UNODC, 2013), http://www.
unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/TOCTA_EAP_web.pdf; UNODC, World Drug
Report (Vienna: UNODC, 2014c), http://www.unodc.org/documents/wdr2014/World_Drug_
Report_2014_web.pdf; and U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy
Report (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2011), http://www.state.gov/documents/organiza
tion/156575.pdf.
3 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington: U.S.
State Department, 2010–2014), http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/; UNODC, Transnational
Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific; and UNODC, Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in
Viet Nam: A Review of the Availability, Use and Implications for Health and Security (Bangkok:
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Trafficking into and out of Vietnam traditionally utilizes land routes,
although sea and air routes are becoming more important. Particularly, crystal
methamphetamine is increasingly entering Vietnamese airports from Africa and
the Middle East. Vietnam’s long, porous, and poorly controlled land borders and
extensive coastline, and high levels of corruption within – and limited resources
for – law enforcement, compromise the effectiveness of interdiction.4
Despite fairly ineffective anti-smuggling efforts, there are occasional reports
from the state-controlled media of violent armed resistance from smugglers on
the Chinese and Laotian borders. For example, in July 2014 a clash between the
police and 25 armed smugglers left one police officer and two smugglers dead.5
Many of these overland smugglers are from ethnic groups that populate the
highlands of Southeast Asia; some have been involved in smuggling for genera-
tions and are often organized by traffickers. While ethnic Chinese tend to be the
most prominent traffickers in Southeast Asia, including Vietnam, they are also
joined by a growing number of foreign traffickers, including West Africans,
whose presence is growing.6
Consumption
As of December 2013, 181,396 people were registered in Vietnam as drug-depen-
dent.7 The actual number of users is likely much higher, since data collection
UNODC, 2012), http://www.unodc.org/documents/southeastasiaandpacific//vietnam/publica
tion/ATS_EN_Final_10042012_-_reduced_size.pdf. For example, Vietnam remains one of the
five most important sources of heroin, and increasingly methamphetamine, entering
Australia. In 2013 and 2014 Australia made a number of seizures of ATS precursor chemicals,
primarily ephedrine and pseudoephedrine, for details, see UNODC, Patterns and Trends of
Amphetamine-Type Stimulants.
4 UNODC, Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in Viet Nam; UNODC, Patterns and Trends of
Amphetamine-Type Stimulants; U.S. Department of State, 2011 International Narcotics Control
Strategy Report (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2011); and U.S. Department of State, 2012
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (Washington: U.S. State Department, 2012), 464,
http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2012/database/index.htm.
5 “Vietnam Police Office, 2 Drug Traffickers Die in Fire Exchange,” Tuoi Tre News, July 20, 2014,
http://tuoitrenews.vn/society/21082/1-vietnam-police-officer-2-drug-traffickers-die-in-fire-
exchange; See UNODC, Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in Viet Nam.
6 UNODC, Transnational Organized Crime in East Asia and the Pacific.
7 UNODC, Drug Dependence: Viet Nam is Discussing Voluntary Community Based Treatment and
Care (UNODC, 2014a), http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/vietnam/2014/06/
drug-workshop/story.html.
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remains poor and many users are unwilling to enter state-run treatment pro-
grams due to the threat of police harassment and incarceration in compulsory
treatment centers. Heroin is the most widely consumed drug in Vietnam. In 2011,
0.53% of the population consumed an opioid and/or an opiate at least once – a
significantly higher number than the Asian average of 0.40% (opioid) and
0.30% (opiate).8 Injection is the most popular mode of ingestion.9
ATS consumption is expanding rapidly. Methamphetamine pills (yaa baa)
and ecstasy consumption have increased every year since 2003 and experienced
another sharp rise after 2007. In several areas bordering Cambodia, metham-
phetamine has even overtaken heroin as the main drug consumed.10 There has
also been a significant increase in crystal methamphetamine consumption since
2008.11 Although traditionally ATS consumption has been confined to young
people in urban areas, their use in rural areas is growing. The consumption of
ketamine and “Sea Water” (GHB) is also rising, particularly among young people
in night-time entertainment venues. We could witness further increase in ATS
consumption if domestic manufacturing increases and/or foreign traffickers seek
to diversify from their reliance on the large Thai consumer market to begin
expanding their operations to Vietnam.
Key Harms and Threats
Aside from the usual harms associated with heroin consumption (i.e. acquisitive
crime, and the impact on health and wellbeing associated with consumption),12
the most significant threat to national health is the spread of HIV by people who
inject drugs. At the start of 2014 an estimated 256,000 people – 0.26% of the
general population aged over 15 – were living with HIV. Roughly 14,000 new
infections were annually reported between 2010 and 2013. While prevalence has
8 UNODC, World Drug Report.
9 Van Nguyen and Maria Scannapieco, “Drug Abuse in Vietnam: A Critical Review of the
Literature and Implications for Future Research,” Addiction 103 (2008).
10 UNODC, Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants; and UNODC, Amphetamine-
Type Stimulants in Viet Nam.
11 UNODC, Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 2014–2017 (Bangkok: UNODC, 2013), http://
www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/regional-programme/index.html.
12 Mortality rates among people who inject drugs in Vietnam is estimated at 13.4 times higher
than among the general population – for details, see Eleanor Hayes-Larson et al., “Drug Users
in Hanoi, Vietnam: Factors Associated with Membership in Community-Based Drug User
Groups,” Harm Reduction Journal 10(1) (2013).
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dropped from its peak in the early-2000s,13 Vietnam continues to have one of
Asia’s fastest growing HIV rates.14 HIV prevalence is higher in certain localities –
especially Northern and South Eastern provinces, Hanoi, and Ho Chi Minh City –
and has ranged from 1.0% (Da Nang Province) to 56% (Quang Ninh Province).
Reported cases of AIDS and mortality from HIV/AIDS have, however, remained
fairly steady since 2009.15 That said, the level of HIV may be underestimated as
many people with HIV and other blood borne diseases are unwilling to present
themselves for treatment due to stigma and discrimination within their commu-
nities and the medical profession.
Intravenous drug use is the primary means of contracting HIV in Vietnam:
Around 60% of all new HIV cases are contracted through needle sharing.16 In
2011, an estimated 335,990 people – approximately 0.53% of the population –
injected drugs. The number of people who inject drugs continues to increase,17
partly due to the increased popularity of intravenous crystal methamphetamine
consumption.
In 2013, an estimated 11.6% of people who inject drugs lived with HIV, down
from 13.4% in 2011,18 and 29.0% in 2002.19 While prevalence of HIV amongst
people who inject drugs does differ dramatically between provinces – ranging
from 18.2% in Ho Chi Minh City to 34% in Thai Nguyen Province20 – the
introduction of needle exchanges and methadone maintenance programs have
reduced the number of people sharing needles, which in the mid-2000s was as
high as 81% in some provinces.21
13 Government of Vietnam, Vietnam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the 2011
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS (March 2014), http://www.aidsdatahub.org/sites/default/files/
publication/Vietnam_narrative_report_2014.pdf.
14 Bach Xuan Tran, “Willingness to Pay for Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Vietnamese
Epicenters of Injection-Drug Driven HIV Infection,” Bulletin of the World Health Organization,
No. 91 (2013), http://www.who.int/bulletin/volumes/91/7/12-115147/en/.
15 Government of Vietnam, Vietnam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the 2011
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS.
16 Lei Zhang et al., “Evaluation of a Decade of DFID and World Bank Supported HIV and AIDS
Programmes in Vietnam from 2003 to 2012” (University of New South Wales, 2014), https://
www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/303560/Decade-DFID-
World-Bank-Support-HIV-Aids-Prog-Vietnam-2003-2012.pdf.
17 UNODC, World Drug Report.
18 UNODC, World Drug Report; and UNODC, Regional Programme for Southeast Asia 2014–2017.
19 Ministry of Health, Government of Vietnam, Results of national HIV sentinel surveillance
(Vietnam: Ministry of Health, 2013).
20 Government of Vietnam, Vietnam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the 2011
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS.
21 Nguyen and Scannapieco, “Drug Abuse in Vietnam.”
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An Overview of Vietnam’s Drug Policies
Vietnam is going through a slow, but significant transformation from one of the
world’s more punitive countries with respect to illicit drug use to one starting to
incorporate harm-reduction approaches into its drug policy. It is also one of a
small number of states to have suppressed the illicit production and cultivation of
opium – an intervention centered upon coercion with limited rural development.
The Legal Framework and Drug Policy Conceptualization
Since the early 1990s Vietnam’s official and publicly-stated view of illicit drugs
has been that they are a “social evil” to be eradicated: Article 61 of the 1992
Constitution declared drug use a “dangerous social disease”22 and laid the foun-
dation for some of the world’s toughest drugs laws. The 2000 Law on Preventing
and Combating Narcotic Drugs reiterated that drugs are a danger to both the
public health and national security, stating, “The drug problem poses a major
threat to the entire society, doing harm to human health, causing offspring
degeneration, degrading human dignity, disrupting family happiness, and gravely
affecting social order and safety and national security.”23A 1997 amendment to the
1985 Criminal Code established the death penalty for possession of more than 100
g of heroin or 5 kg of opium – an estimated 700 prisoners are on death row as of
2014, the majority for drug offenses.24 In June 2014, for example, 29 people were
sentenced to death for smuggling two tons of heroin into Vietnam from Laos.
However, despite the highly punitive policies toward smuggling and use,
the growing HIV epidemic has gradually been shifting the ruling Communist
Party’s perception of the drug problem. To address the HIV epidemic, harm-
reduction approaches have been gradually introduced and the 2006 Law on
AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control emphasized “encouragement of the use of [...]
clean syringes and needles, treatment of addiction to opium-related substances
with substitute substances, and other harm reduction intervention measures.”25
22 Government of Vietnam, Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, No. 61 (1992),
http://www.na.gov.vn/htx/English/C1479/#BSi1T823Fk4U.
23 Government of Vietnam, The Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs (2000),
http://www.unodc.org/enl/showDocument.do?documentUid=2304&cuntry=VIE.
24 “Vietnam Sentences 30 Heroin Smugglers to Death in Biggest Drugs Trial,” The Telegraph,
January 20, 2014, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/vietnam/10584932/
Vietnam-sentences-30-heroin-smugglers-to-death-in-biggest-drugs-trial.html.
25 Government of Vietnam, Law on AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control (2006), http://test.aidsportal.
org/atomicDocuments/AIDSPortalDocuments/VietnamGovLawHIVPreventionControl2006.pdf.
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But despite the gradual implementation of harm-reduction approaches,
many legal and practical contradictions and obstacles to an effective public-
health approach persist. The Law on AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control is in
conflict with the 2000 Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs, which
is widely interpreted as prohibiting the possession of needles. To remove some
of these contradictions, the 2000 Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic
Drugs was amended in 2008 to provide support for the harm reduction measures
proscribed in the Law on AIDS/HIV Prevention and Control. And in 2009, the
Penal Code was amended to characterize drug users as patients rather than
criminals. While some academics have interpreted this as the decriminalization
of drug consumption, the Ordinance on Administrative Violations continues to
categorize drug use as an administrative violation and users are still frequently
sent to compulsory drug treatment centers and imprisoned there. In fact, under
the Ordinance, police feel obligated to arrest and incarcerate drug users.26
Treatment
Treatment in Vietnam has centered upon the incarceration of drug users in
compulsory treatment centers known as 06 Centers. This system was established
by Article 61 of the 1992 Constitution, which specified that “the State provides for
compulsory treatment of drug addiction and certain dangerous social diseases.”27
Article 199 of the 2000 Law on Preventing and Combatting Narcotic Drugs
additionally mandates that users who relapse after being sent to 06 Centers be
sentenced to between three months and two years of imprisonment – in a regular
prison for the first relapse and between two and five years for the second
relapse.28
In 2011, there were 123 06 Centers in operation, managed by the Ministry of
Labour, Invalids and Social Affairs; local authorities; and in smaller numbers, the
Youth Union. Out of the 29,535 people in treatment in 2010, 24,155 were placed in
06 Centers and 5,380 in community or home-based treatment programs.29
The majority of 06 Center inmates are arrested by the police or delivered to
the centers by family members. Local authorities can sentence individuals to a
maximum of two years imprisonment in the Center, although the incarceration
26 Thu Vuong, Robert Ali, Simon Baldwin, and Stephen Mills, “Drug Policy in Vietnam: A
Decade of Change?” International Journal of Drug Policy, 23 (2012).
27 Government of Vietnam, Constitution of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam.
28 Government of Vietnam, The Law on Preventing and Combating Narcotic Drugs.
29 UNODC, Patterns and Trends of Amphetamine-Type Stimulants.
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period can be extended by up to two years for post-treatment monitoring and
management if the individual is seen as being at risk of relapse.30
06 Centres have been heavily criticized as ineffective and contrary to human
rights norms.31 Inmates are widely reported to be beaten with sticks and electric
batons for violating rules or attempting to escape.32 The homeless are often
arrested and sent to 06 Centers to fill police quotas.33 Since clinical care is poor
and treatment is not based on best practices and scientific evidence, relapse rates
are high.34 In fact, 06 Centers strongly resemble labor camps: “treatment” is
centered on “labor therapy,” such as the processing of cashew nuts or sewing
cloths, in conjunction with detoxification, the performance of military drills, and
chanting of anti-drug slogans. Furthermore, post-release support services are
limited, and the stigma of being an 06 Center inmate often makes it difficult for
users to reintegrate back into their communities, find work, and access health care.
Paradoxically, the risk of contracting HIV is higher in some 06 Centers than
in the communities, compounding the ineffectiveness of the compulsory treat-
ment system: While drug consumption levels are lower in 06 Centers than in the
communities, there is minimal access to sterile needles and condoms, and thus
the spread of HIV and other communicable diseases is actually greater.35
30 Ibid.
31 Human Rights Watch, The Rehab Archipelago: Forced Labor and Other Abuses in Drug Detention
Centers in Southern Vietnam (New York: Human Rights Watch, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/sites/
default/files/reports/vietnam0911ToPost.pdf; UNAIDS, Joint UN Statement Calls for the Closure of
Compulsory Drug Detention and Rehabilitation Centers (2012b), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources
/presscentre/featurestories/2012/march/20120308adetentioncenters; UNODC, Amphetamine-Type
Stimulants in Viet Nam; U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(2014); and World Health Organization (WHO), A Strategy to Halt and Reverse the HIV Epidemic
Among People who Inject Drugs in Asia and the Pacific: 2010–2015 (New York: WHO, 2010), http://
www.who.int/hiv/pub/idu/searo_harm_reduction_strategy2010-2015.pdf?ua=1.
32 Human Rights Watch, The Rehab Archipelago: Forced Labor and Other Abuses in Drug
Detention Centers in Southern Vietnam; and “Drug Detention Centres Offer Torture, Not
Treatment,” States News Service, July 24, 2014.
33 Melissa Jardine, et al., “Harm Reduction and Law Enforcement in Vietnam: influences on
street policing,” Harm Reduction Journal, Vol. 9:27 (2012).
34 Hayes-Larson et al., “Drug Users in Hanoi, Vietnam”; Tomori et al., “‘In Their Perception We
Are Addicts’: Social Vulnerabilities and Sources of Support for Men Released from Drug
Treatment Centers in Vietnam,” International Journal of Drug Policy (2014): 897–904; and
UNODC, Amphetamine-Type Stimulants in Viet Nam.
35 Nguyen Tran Hien, et al., “The Social Context of HIV Risk Behavior by Drug Injectors in Ho
Chi Minh City, Vietnam,” AIDS Care, 12 (2000), http://www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscen
tre/featurestories/2012/october/20121005d; Similar results have been reported elsewhere – see,
for example, Will Small et al., “Injection Drug Use, HIV/AIDS and Incarceration: Evidence from
the Vancouver Injection Drug Users Study,” HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review, 10 (2005): 5–10.
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The threat of arrest, subsequent imprisonment, and forced detoxification in
06 Centers inflate risky injecting behavior and prevent access to health care,
including HIV/AIDS treatment and prevention. Users will often prepare, mix,
and inject their drugs hastily, and discard syringes as quickly as possible to
avoid detection. While possession of needles is legal, and they are distributed by
the state, or organizations supported by the state, many users feel that posses-
sion will lead to arrest and incarceration in 06 Centers, or inclusion on police
black-lists – which results in police harassment. Furthermore, those who have
been imprisoned in 06 Centers often refuse to access any form of harm reduction
services as to do so would advertise to the police that they have relapsed, which
can result in prison or a further term in an 06 Center.
Encouragingly, Vietnam has declared its intention to reduce the number of
06 Centers in its December 2013 Drug Rehabilitation Renovation Plan. The Plan
also committed itself to increase resources for community-based voluntary
treatment centers.36 Yet despite the Plan’s commitments, Vietnam appears intent
on fixing the compulsory treatment system rather than eliminating it altogether.
Indeed, in April 2014, the Secretariat of the Communist Party Central Committee
called for an improvement in the quality of detoxification centers, rather than
their removal.37 A 2012 amendment to the Law on Handling of Administrative
Violations established due process for processing compulsory treatment.38 While
this is a welcome development, it also codified the continuous use of 06 Centers.
While treatment does not necessarily have to be 100% voluntary to be effective,
it does need to adhere to a base of evidence which suggests that patients need to
feel safe and secure, and that treatment should be tailored to their individual
circumstances rather a one-size-fits-all approach.
Harm Reduction
Despite the long-standing repressive attitudes and contradictions in laws and
policies, the HIV epidemic has forced Vietnam to gradually take more harm
36 Government of Vietnam, Vietnam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the 2011
Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS; UNODC, Viet Nam is Discussing Voluntary Community Based
Treatment and Care; U.S. State Department, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (2014);
UNAIDS, Alternative Action on Compulsory Detention: Innovative Responses in Asia (2012a), http://
www.unaids.org/en/resources/presscentre/featurestories/2012/october/20121005detentioncenters;
and UNODC, Viet Nam Communes Trials Community-Based Drug Dependence Treatment (2012),
http://www.unodc.org/southeastasiaandpacific/en/vietnam/2012/03/cbtx/story.html.
37 “Vietnam: Party Secretariat calls for Stronger Leadership to Prevent Drug Crime,” Thai News
Service, April 16, 2014.
38 UNODC, Viet Nam is Discussing Voluntary Community Based Treatment and Care.
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reduction approaches. The provision of methadone maintenance and needle
exchange programs is growing.
Pilot methadone maintenance programs – administered between 1997 and
2002 and extended to 2011 – were considered by the Government of Vietnam to
be successful in reducing HIV and acquisitive crime and improving the health of
users and public health overall. Rolled out nationally in 2008, methadone
maintenance programs have been expanding and in early 2014 were available
to 15,542 patients across 80 sites in 30 provinces and cities. The Vietnamese
government has even acknowledged that current availability is inadequate,
especially in high consumption areas, and committed itself to expand metha-
done access to 80,000 drug users by 2015. To reach this target, five medical
schools and national hospitals have been allowed to deliver training on metha-
done maintenance, and five Vietnamese companies have been licensed to man-
ufacture methadone.39
Vietnam also runs “some form” of needle exchange programs in most pro-
vinces. In 2012, it was distributing 180 needles/syringes per injecting user.40 While
180 needles per user is above the Asian regional median of 116, it remains below
the UNAIDS recommendation of 200.41 While 12 of Vietnam’s 32 provinces have
reached UNAIDS’ target,42 the national ratio unfortunately dropped to 98 per
injecting user in 2013.43 This reduction likely reflects the close of funding for
needle exchange programs by the World Bank and UK Department for
International Development (DFID) in 2012. Distribution also varies dramatically
across provinces, ranging from 16 per person (Son La province) to 669 per person
(Ha Tinh province).44
Some projects have been innovative, such as providing needles through tea
stalls and “secret boxes” that reduce users’ risk of being identified by the police
and arrested. Improved access to clean needles has reduced needle-sharing in
39 Government of Vietnam, Viet Nam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the
2011 Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS; and Ward Cates, “A World Without AIDS? A Promising
Approach Is Bringing Vietnam Closer,” The Huffington Post, November 26, 2013, http://www.
huffingtonpost.com/ward-cates/a-world-without-aids-a-pr_b_4344058.html.
40 Government of Vietnam, Viet Nam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the
2011 Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, 3.
41 UNAIDS, The Gap Report (Geneva: UNAIDS, 2014), http://www.unaids.org/sites/default/files/
en/media/unaids/contentassets/documents/unaidspublication/2014/UNAIDS_Gap_report_en.pdf.
42 Zhang et al., “Evaluation of a Decade of DFID and World Bank Supported HIV and AIDS
Programs,” 6.
43 Government of Vietnam, Viet Nam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the
2011 Political Declaration on HIV/AIDS, 3.
44 Zhang et al., “Evaluation of a Decade of DFID and World Bank Supported HIV and AIDS
Programs,” 36.
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many areas: 26 of 32 provinces in which DFID and the World Bank administered
needle exchange programs witnessed a decline in HIV prevalence, and none of
the provinces which provided clean needles reported a growth in HIV preva-
lence. Lei Zhang and colleagues estimate that 26,822 HIV infections have been
prevented by needle-exchange programs, and that for every US dollar spent on
needle-exchanges, US$1.93 was returned in saved healthcare costs.45
Overall, the introduction of harm reduction principles has started to con-
tribute to a reduction in HIV cases. The HIV rate among users who inject drugs
declined from 30% in the mid-1990s to 11.6% in 2013.46
But despite the expanding implementation of these effective programs, as
well as the above-discussed improvements in national drug laws and regula-
tions, significant challenges and barriers to effective harm reduction and drug
policy remain. In addition to the continuation of the 06 Centers, uninformed and
discriminatory attitudes of medical professionals in Vietnam and abusive police
practices are among the most detrimental. The prevalent police culture views
forced detoxification as the only means of reducing the threat that drug users
pose to society. Such attitudes are exacerbated by a lack of police training about
the effectiveness of harm reduction. Indeed, local police use harm reduction
programs as mechanisms to identify drug users. Equally counterproductive, they
tend to harass and even arrest harm reduction workers.
Local police also continue to receive quotas for the number of users they are
required to arrest to ensure that 06 Centers are full, while managers of, and
stakeholders in, 06 Centers profit from inmates’ cheap labor.47 As such, there is
a large network of police and 06 Center workers with vested interests in centers
being full.
Yet there are a few hopeful signs that attitudes among some within the
Vietnamese police may slowly be changing. For example, Lam Tien Dung, a
Lieutenant Colonel at the People’s Police Academy stated at the 2014
International AIDS Conference in Melbourne that:
Harm reduction approaches to HIV prevention among sex workers and drugs users have
been scientifically proven by public health experts, but cannot be successful without the
active participation of law enforcement […] We used to think of these people as our targets,
but now we see them as our partners. By working with HIV experts to develop strong police
45 Ibid., 48.
46 “Compulsory Detention for Drug Use Undermines Treatment in Laos,” IRIN, August 19, 2014,
http://www.irinnews.org/report/98920/compulsory-detention-for-drug-use-undermines-treat
ment-in-laos.
47 Human Rights Watch, The Rehab Archipelago: Forced Labor and Other Abuses in Drug
Detention Centers in Southern Vietnam.
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practices grounded in public health and human rights, we can help control the spread of
HIV among these groups – and the general population.48
Furthermore, Vietnam used the 2014 World Drug Day to appeal for an end to the
stigmatization and discrimination of drug users (in addition to the obligatory
burning of drugs).49
Suppression of Opium Poppy Cultivation50
Vietnam is one of only a handful of countries to have suppressed opium
production. After decades of cultivation, Vietnam succeeded in suppressing
production in the late 1990s/early 2000s through a policy of enforced eradica-
tion. Although eradication was nominally negotiated and nominally accompa-
nied by alternative livelihoods efforts, in practice coercion underpinned the
policy.
There is a long tradition of opium production by some ethnic groups, who
have cultivated poppy since migrating to the northern highlands from China in
the early to mid-nineteenth century.51 Successive regimes had attempted, often
unsuccessfully, to monopolize this production and trade. In 1899 France over-
turned local prohibitions52 on opium consumption and trade by establishing a
monopoly in its new colony. To avoid conflict, highland farmers were allowed to
produce opium for their own consumption; however, much highland opium was
subsequently exported to the lowland black market where it competed with
monopoly opium. Then, in 1905, to prevent competition with monopoly
opium, the colonial French government attempted to procure all highland
opium. The price paid was small, so little was surrendered and the highlands
continued to supply the lowland black market. The colonial government ceased
48 “Police Join Forces with HIV Experts to Turn Tide of HIV Amongst Sex Workers and Drug
Users,” States News Service, July 21, 2014.
49 UNODC,World Drug Day 2014 (UNODC, 2014b), http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/frontpage/
2014/July/world-drug-day-2014_-activities-across-the-globe.html.
50 This section is a summary of findings presented in James Windle, “The Suppression of Illicit
Opium Production in Viet Nam: An Introductory Narrative,” Crime, Law and Social Change, Vol.
57 (2012); and James Windle, Suppressing Illicit Opium Production in Asia and the Middle East:
Successful Intervention and national drug Policies (London: I.B. Taurus, 2016).
51 The Hmong have traditionally been the most significant opium farmers. In the 1990s roughly
75% of all opium farmers were Hmong, while the Dao, Thai, and Kho Mu groups each accounted
for five%, with the remaining 10% coming from the Tay, Nung, Kinh, Muong, and Han groups.
52 James Windle, “How the East Influenced Drug Prohibition,” The International History
Review, Vol. 35 (2014).
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the procurement of highland opium in 1925 due to the lack of cooperation. The
colonial government once again attempted to monopolize supply in the early-
1940s in response to growing demand for opium from foreign pharmaceutical
industries. The monopoly began promoting highland production by concurrently
increasing highland land taxes and monopoly prices. Insufficient controls over
rural highland areas, however, meant that farmers who had previously grown
only for local consumption enlarged their output in response to growing
demand from both the regulated and black markets. While production increased
during this period, Vietnam remained a minor source in comparison to China,
India, Iran, and Turkey and primarily supplied the domestic market.
Demand for Southeast Asian opium increased during the Vietnam War
(1955–1975) due to the large-scale consumption of heroin by American troops
stationed in Vietnam. The Vietnamese heroin market was supplied from opium
produced in Burma, Laos and Thailand, and supplemented with, at most,
minimal Northern or Southern Vietnamese-produced opium. The South
Vietnamese government, however, claimed that illicit production had ceased
in 1955 after an extensive forced eradication campaign. In 1971, a U.S. Provost
Marshal reported that the North Vietnamese government had regulated some
farmers to produce opium for medicinal purposes. Little is believed to have been
diverted due to the efficient enforcement of the ban on unauthorized production
in areas under their authority. This said, as the government lacked the resources
to provide isolated opium farmers with alternative incomes or modern medi-
cines, a certain amount of production for local demand was unofficially toler-
ated in some areas. Part of this toleration was to avoid destabilizing strategically
important border regions beside local opium farming populations.
In 1975, the Government of Vietnam began procuring highland opium for
domestic and export medical purposes. When the state stopped buying highland
opium in 1985, those who had been selling to the state continued producing
opium, the majority of which was sold on the black market. It appears that
opium was tolerated until Vietnam prohibited opium production in 1992, amidst
concerns about rising domestic opium and heroin consumption. Top-down crop
substitution projects were established in the early-1990s. These state-adminis-
tered projects centered on contracts between the state and farming communities,
in which the state agreed to compensate individual farmers or provide rural
development in exchange for the immediate cessation of opium farming. Drug
control was later mainstreamed into national highland development programs,
aimed at assisting the poorest communes to avoid moral hazard and discourage
farmers from growing opium in order to attract development aid. Even so, the
level of development support remained spotty and sporadic and was consider-
ably lower in the highlands than in the lowland areas. As such, the highland
14 J. Windle
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people continued to suffer chronic poverty. In some highland areas, an emer-
ging tourism industry represented the only alternative income for opium
farmers.
Overall, the development projects did not succeed in alleviating poppy
farmers’ poverty and may have even worsened their living conditions, forcing
many to sell land and/or migrate. While strong national economic growth lifted
many out of poverty – 70% of the population were classified as poor in the mid-
1980s and only 30–40% in the year 2000 – the major opium-producing areas in
the remote highland areas continued to lag economically behind the lowland
and urban areas, and remained plagued by chronic poverty.
Indeed, the core of the poppy suppression effort was coercive negotiations.
From 1992, the official policy was to immediately eradicate poppy crops. The so-
called “negotiated eradication” would begin with the distribution of propaganda
about the harm of opium and with state promises of rural development assis-
tance. The negotiations with farmers were conducted by the military, which
allowed for increased surveillance of opium farming areas. While the presence
of the military itself implied coercion, reports also emerged that soldiers regu-
larly threatened farmers to implement eradication. Other reports of widespread
human rights abuses of the highland peoples at the hands of the military and
police further indicate that the counter-narcotics drivers were far more repres-
sive than is often publicly acknowledged. That said, arrest and prosecution were
officially reserved for systematic re-cultivation, although farmers were often
“administratively” punished. For example, farmers could be placed under
increased surveillance or ordered to reside (possible under house arrest) and
work in a specified area.
However questionable from a human rights perspective, the forced eradica-
tion drives did effectively wipe out the opium poppy. Within a decade, Vietnam
went from being designated as a significant source of opium to having essen-
tially eliminated production.
The key components of Vietnam’s success were the presence of a strong
coercive state presence, manifested in extensive surveillance of and law enforce-
ment presence in opium-producing areas, and the strong leverage the state had
in negotiating eradication. That the actual administration of alternative devel-
opment appears to have been insufficient suggests that disincentives were the
primary motivation for the cessation of opium production. Vietnam’s actions
differed significantly from the more humane and development-orientated
approach developed in neighbouring Thailand. This may be because Vietnam
already possessed authority over its opium farming areas, whereas one of the
main objectives of the Thai intervention was state extension. That is, Vietnam’s
coercive negotiation approach worked because the state possessed authority
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over opium growing areas. It would likely have been less successful in areas
where the state had minimal authority.
Recommendations for Improving Drug Policy
in Vietnam and Lessons for Other Countries
Vietnam’s highly punitive and coercive approach to drug control is slowly
changing as the country seeks to address its ongoing HIV epidemic. That is,
the HIV crisis has motivated Vietnam to change its counter-narcotics laws and
overcome its punitive predisposition. This has resulted in the introduction of
methadone maintenance programs and needle exchanges.
Given that organized crime in Vietnam is limited and drug markets are
essentially non-violent, and that drugs pose principally a public health problem,
at present, Vietnam’s primary concern should be to reduce the harms associated
with drug use via injection. To reduce HIV infection rates and the spread of other
infectious diseases, Vietnam should adopt the following measures:
– Expand methadone maintenance. The provision of methadone maintenance
and other opiate substitution therapy has strong evidence of effectiveness in
terms of reducing harms and, in combination with other treatments, espe-
cially psychosocial services, can be effective in reaching abstinence. It is
cost-effective in relation to other treatment options;53
– Expand needle-exchange programs. There is strong evidence that needle-
exchange programs improve drug users’ health, and benefit the wider
community by reducing the spread of HIV.54
That said, the effectiveness of harm reduction and treatment interventions is
limited if people are unwilling to engage for fear of arrest and incarceration, as
well as subsequent torture, degrading, or inhumane treatment. As such, the
barriers to treatment entry should be lessened. This would include the following:
– The police should be provided new training, instructions, and incentives for
police to arrest users – such as quotas on the number of users to be
arrested – should be removed. The police – and other state employees –
should be trained in harm reduction techniques and made aware of what
services are available. This will need to be conducted in conjunction with
53 John Strange et al., “Drug Policy and the Public Good: Evidence for Effective Interventions,”
The Lancet, 379 (2012): 71–83.
54 Strange et al., “Drug Policy and the Public Good: Evidence for Effective Interventions.”
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media campaigns and proclamations by high level politicians and state
employees aimed at reducing the stigma attached to injecting drug users
amongst the police, medical profession, and general public. The overall aim
of these policies will be to remove barriers to treatment erected by a
prevalent culture which views forced detoxification as the only means of
reducing a “social evil;”
– Close 06 Centers. The available evidence suggests that compulsory treat-
ment centers are abusive and ineffective in terms of reaching the goals of
harm reduction and abstinence. In fact, the centers may actually spread
HIV. 06 Centers are, however, unlikely to be removed without alternatives
in place. Vietnam must be presented cost-effective and politically viable
alternatives. As such, the international community should support knowl-
edge exchange on what works in treatment. International and domestic
training for competent drug treatment and prevention providers should be
expanded. This could perhaps include training and visits to treatment
centers in Europe and the United States.
While the key harms and threats associated with illicit drugs in Vietnam are
public health issues, further regional economic integration will likely increase
the flow of drugs through Vietnam. And Vietnam does have some weak points
which make it vulnerable to traffickers, including its long and poorly controlled
border; high levels of corruption within, and limited resources for, law enforce-
ment and border security; and its poorly regulated control of precursor chemi-
cals. As such:
– Vietnam should take pre-emptive measures by imposing stringent regula-
tion to control industries using precursor chemicals to prevent a further
increase in ATS consumption and manufacturing;
– Vietnam should improve training of border guards, take steps to reduce
corruption, and scale-up cooperation with its neighbors.
The adoption and implementation of many of these policies will likely produce
resistance from the police and at least some local authorities. Even though the
central Communist Party is capable of pushing through change at the national
level, local-level implementation of harm reduction and treatment policies may
be slowed by zero-tolerance cultures. While training and media campaigns may
help alter the long-term institutional culture of the police, implementing agen-
cies will need to be persuaded by central government. This will likely require not
only exhortation through legislation but also the provision of incentives from the
government and possibly external actors. This could range from improved
resources for local agencies to rewards for local officials who comply. As the
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managers of 06 Centers profit from inmates’ cheap labor, they will likely repre-
sent an additional barrier to change, and such workers may need to be diverted
to alternative economic activity.
Many of these policy recommendations require considerable financial
resources. As Vietnam emerges as a middle-income country, the level of funding
from international donors for harm reduction and law enforcement vis-à-vis
drugs is declining. For example, the Government of Vietnam estimated that
the cost of HIV services increased by 60% between 2011 and 2015; however, its
budget could fund just six% to 12% of 2014 HIV services.55 Around 73% of all
HIV prevention and treatment services, including harm reduction, have histori-
cally been funded by foreign donors.56 An independent report for DFID and the
World Bank concluded that:
If current programs are not maintained in the future, then it can be expected that HIV
epidemics will increase substantially, particularly among PWID [people who inject drugs],
with the potential for further spread beyond the populations most at risk.57
As such, the international community needs to continue supporting Vietnam to
reduce HIV. Support for preventive measures against potential threats asso-
ciated with precursor chemicals and increased border trade may also be
required.
Vietnam and UNGASS 2016
Combatting drug consumption and smuggling continue to be high priorities of the
Government of Vietnam. Nonetheless, HIV prevention has also become a high
priority. It is unlikely that Vietnam will be supportive of liberal reforms of the
three drug control treaties. Indeed, it is more likely to be supportive of maintain-
ing the status quo and potentially stricter supply side interventions, especially as
punitive measures tend to receive strong support from the general public.
The HIV epidemic has, however, forced many Vietnamese policy-makers to
question Vietnam’s punitive approach to drug use. As such, Vietnam may come
55 Tran, “Willingness to Pay for Methadone Maintenance Treatment in Vietnamese Epicenters
of Injection-Drug Driven HIV Infection”; Cates, “A World Without AIDS?”; and Government of
Vietnam, Viet Nam AIDS Response Progress Report 2014: Following up the 2011 Political
Declaration on HIV/AIDS.
56 Zhang et al., “Evaluation of a Decade of DFID and World Bank Supported HIV and AIDS
Programmes.”
57 Ibid., 10.
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out as a proponent of harm reduction not just domestically, but even at the
United Nations. The 2014 Plan for Socio-Economic Development, for example,
calls for the scaling up of methadone maintenance and voluntary treatment
services, even as it reiterates that drug use is a “social evil.”58
In short, Vietnam will likely attempt to present a picture of a determined
drug-control country that takes a hard line against drug traffickers and dealers
even while increasingly adopting, and perhaps even endorsing internationally,
harm reduction approaches as important means for reducing the spread of HIV.
Conclusion
This briefing has shown how Vietnamese drug policy is in a period of change. It
has slowly moved from having one of the world’s more repressive drug policies
to embracing certain aspects of harm reduction. These changes have come about
because Vietnam has suffered one of Asia’s worst ongoing HIV epidemics, and
needle exchanges and methadone maintenance programs do appear to have
reduced the spread of HIV. There are, however, many barriers to sustaining
these successes. These center upon the continued existence of 06 Centers, the
stigma attached to drug users by those in the medical profession and police, and
the abuse that drug users receive from law enforcement. The declining level of
funding from international donors for harm reduction and law enforcement vis-
à-vis drugs is also worrying. It is not known whether Vietnam will be able to
upscale or even maintain harm reduction; much will depend upon whether the
Vietnamese government possesses the political will to invest. If they do not, or
cannot, then the success in reducing HIV rates could be reversed.
The briefing has also shown how Vietnam is one of a small number of states
to have suppressed the illicit production and cultivation of opium. Reductions
from 1993 onwards were centered upon coercive negotiations employing “stern
threats” of violence by the military or administrative sanctions. The lack of
alternative development pushed many farmers deeper into poverty. While suc-
cessful, it is worth remembering that the intervention would not have been
possible without a government who perceived suppression as in their best
interest, possessed authority over the majority of its national territory, and had
the capability to monitor farmers and administer law enforcement.
58 “Major Tasks and Solutions Guiding and Directing the Realization of the Plan for Socio-
Economic Development and State Budget Estimate in 2014,” States News Service, January 2, 2014.
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The case of Vietnam provides lessons for other states. First, it demonstrates
how repressive law enforcement and compulsory detention for drug offenses can
present barriers to effective treatment and harm reduction. Second, needle
exchanges and methadone maintenance can help reduce the transmission of
HIV. Third, illicit drug crop cultivation and production can be suppressed using
coercion and eradication, without the support of alternative development, but
only if the state possesses authority over the majority of opium farming areas.
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